Knowledge in microeconomics and institutional economics is strongly recommended.
Interest in experimental economics and game theory is helpful.

As this is a seminar, students must work through 3-hours of lectures that are supplied as pre-recorded videos, to be found in the "video"-section. The slides can be found in the "Dateien"-section on StudIP. Students must prove their understanding of this material in an introductory online-exam in the form of a single-choice test. The test takes place on Sep 30. The exam must be passed for being accepted to the subsequent seminar, which is conducted as a face-to-face event. Students must attend all parts of the seminar without exception.

Case studies, games and simulations are core ingredients of the face-to-face part of the course. These motivate and guide participants in developing their own experiment. This development and subsequent implementation is deepened by help of group-work. Groups jointly develop, design and run an experiment related to corruption and present the findings briefly in the plenary. Each individual participant then submits a final report on the findings. The deadline for the reports will be announced during the workshop.

For 7 ECTS Portfolio exam (Master IEB, DS and other programs): 20 points introductory online-exam (20 minutes) and 80 points short report (5,000 characters) on the research findings from the group work, where the own contribution to the group work is explained.

10 ECTS can be obtained in the Master Governance and Public Policy in "§ 7 Modulbereich C: Transfer, Research Tutorial". To achieve this higher level of ECTS, a short thesis (3,000 characters) must be written to a topic to be determined. This thesis will be graded and contribute 25 points to the total grade (15 are then allocated to the introductory online-exam and 60 to the short report).

2+2

Lambsdorff, j. Graf (2007), "The New Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform: Theory, Evidence and Policy". Cambridge University Press.
Lambsdorff, J. Graf (2009),The Organization of Anticorruption - Getting Incentives Right. In: Corruption, Global Security, and World Order, ed. by R. Rotberg, (The Brooking Institution Press: Washington, D.C., 2009): 389-415.
Lambsdorff, J. Graf (2015), Preventing Corruption by Promoting Trust - Insights from Behavioral Science. University of Passau, Version: Diskussionsbeitrag Nr. V-69-15 (Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe der Passauer Diskussionspapiere).

Blocked course, starting prior to the winter semester, every 2 semesters.

Understand the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), including its limitations; Consider results from field studies and their relationships to the CPI.
Comprehend how corrupt actors enforce their deals and avoid being cheated, including the role played by kompromat, trust, reputation, intermediaries and vertical integration.
Understand the role played reciprocity as a method for enforcing corrupt deals. Investigate how gift-limit rules, leniency, punishing abuse of functions and nullity impact corrupt behavior.
Attain comprehension on the behavioral contribution to anti-corruption, including the role played by nudges. Gain an understanding of the interplay between control and intrinsic motivation.

Online-Videos: Required total time = 30 hrs. plus 30 hrs. self-work time for preparing introductory exam.
Face-to-face event: 60 hours, Writing of report 90 hrs.

Calculation is based on the workload for 7 ECTS (210 hrs.).

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